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I. Introduction
It is a widespread belief among economists that monetary policy affects the in-
vestment of firms through the cost of capital and the credit channel. However, the
available evidence shows that the cost of capital channel of monetary policy has
no effect on corporate investment in France at the macroeconomic level. Three
French forecasting models developed in the 1990s do not include the cost of
capital (see Amadeus by INSEE, Mosaïque by OFCE, and the model developed
by the Banque de France), while INSEE's Metric model adds a relative factor cost
whose parameter is small (-0.016) and not significant (see Assouline et al. 1998).
Herbet (2001) published a recent estimation of macroeconomic investment and
recognised its failure to incorporate interest rate or user cost effects.
Four recent studies have focused on the effect of the user cost at the firm
level. The results vary considerably. Using the BACH European database “aggre-
gated by size and sector” based on Banque de France sample data, Beaudu and
Heckel (2001) found a zero elasticity for the four largest euro area countries in-
cluding France. Using the INSEE BIC-BRN database, Duhautois (2001) aggre-
gated data by sector and size from 1985 to 1996. He found a real interest rate
elasticity of -0.38 for the period 1985-1990 and of -0.27 for the period 1991-1996.
Using a sample of individual firm accounts (INSEE BIC database), Crépon and
Gianella (2001) obtained a user cost elasticity of -0.63 for industry and of -0.35 for
services over the period 1990-1995. Using the BACH database, like Beaudu and
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Heckel (2001), Mojon Smets and Vermeulen (2001) obtained a high elasticity for
the user cost for France (-0.75). These studies show that we obtain a high user
cost elasticity if (1) the sample period is short and/or (2) the cash flow or the
growth of sales is omitted from the regression and/or (3) within estimates are
used instead of dynamic panel data estimates, as in the generalised method of
moments (Arrelano and Bond (1991)) and/or (4) when defining the user cost, the
marginal cost of debt is computed by a proxy at the firm level instead of an in-
terest rate at the national level.
At the firm level, the existence of a broad credit channel of monetary policy in
France is indirectly addressed. The main result is that financial variables (nota-
bly cash flow) affect the investment of groups of firms that are likely to be finan-
cially constrained (see Chatelain 2002). The interpretation of investment cash
flow excess sensitivity for some group of firms as a signal of financial constraints
has been challenged by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). However, if the sample
separation criterion is itself a precise measure of financial constraints, (e.g.
credit rating is a more precise criterion to identify financially constrained firms
than the low dividend payout criterion used by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988)), the investment cash flow excess sensitivity is more likely to signal fi-
nancial constraints than demand effects. Models which define investment as a
function of sales growth and cash flow have been around for a long time (see
Bond et al. 1997; Hall, Mairesse, Mulkay 1999; 2000). Several recent studies
have estimated the excess sensitivity of investment to liquidity variables, such
as cash flow, the stock of cash, leverage and the coverage ratio. Crépon and
Rosenwald (2001) showed that the leverage parameter was lower for small
firms during the years of sustained activity, i.e. 1988 and 1989 (their estimation
period was 1986-1993). This means that the agency premium was lower for
these firms at that time. The neo-classical demand for capital estimated by
Beaudu and Heckel (2001) led to greater investment cash flow sensitivity for
small firms during years of monetary restriction. In Duhautois (2001), leverage
explains small firms’ investment from 1985 to 1996 in a regression where sales
growth is an omitted variable. Using Euler investment equations, where the cost
of debt increases with leverage, Chatelain and Teurlai (2000) showed a cash
flow misspecification (which is an indirect test of investment cash flow excess
sensitivity consistent with the Lucas critique) for firms with a low dividend/payout
ratio or a low investment/retained earnings ratio. Finally, Chatelain and Teurlai
(2001) found that small firms with a high variation of debt and a high share of
capital financed by leasing displayed an investment leverage excess sensitivity
during the economic downturn between 1993 and 1996.
This paper provides estimates of the elasticity of the user cost of capital and
of investment cash flow excess sensitivities. We extend the analysis developed
by Chatelain et al. (2001) by using more precise sample separation criteria to
isolate financially constrained firms and by comparing several ways of testing
auto-regressive distributed lags models of the neo-classical demand for capital
on a panel data of French manufacturing firms in the nineties (see Bond, Elston,
Mairesse, Mulkay 1997 and Hall, Mairesse and Mulkay 2000; Harhoff and Ramb
2001; Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer 1999).
Section II presents the theoretical model of investment and the estimation
method. Section III gives the macroeconomic background of investment and fi-Investment and the Cost of Capital in the Nineties in France 657
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nance of French companies in the nineties, describes the data set and empirical
results. Section IV concludes.
II. The Intertemporal Behaviour of Firms
1. Theoretical Model
We consider a profit-maximising firm which does not face adjustment costs of
investment but does face tax deductibility of depreciation and interest charges
as well as a marginal cost of debt increasing with leverage. A one-period model
was developed by Auerbach (1983) and Hayashi (2000) presented an intertem-
poral continuous time version. Our presentation is based on discrete time in-
tertemporal optimisation of firms facing uncertainty. With respect to King and
Fullerton's (1984) approach, we do not take into account the differences in
household taxation with respect to dividends and retained earnings nor the dis-
tinction between different capital goods for the computation of the net present
value of depreciation allowances. We assume one financial constraint: the cost
of debt increases with leverage. However, a firm can always get round this con-
straint using negative dividends or new share issues. We do not take into ac-
count other financial constraints such as positive dividends, a transaction cost
for new share issues, or a debt ceiling constraint.
Analysing investment begins with an expression of the value of the firm, which
in turn stems from the arbitrage condition governing the valuation of shares for
risk-neutral investors. The return for the risk-neutral owners of firm i at time t
reflects capital appreciation and current dividends. In equilibrium, if the owners
are to be content holding their shares, this return must equal  t ρ  the nominal
return on other risky financial assets between period t  and period  1 + t :1
(1) () [] ()
t
it
t , i t it t , i t , i t
V
d E V V E
ρ =
+ − Ψ − + + + 1 1 1
In what follows, the subscript i always refers to firm i and the subscript t to
year t,  t E  is the expectation operator conditional on information known at time
t ,  it d  are dividends,  it V  is the firm's nominal market value (it is equal to the
number of existing shares times the share price  E
it p ),  it Ψ  is new share issues.
Solving this iterative arbitrage condition leads investors in firm  i  to choose the
stock of capital and debt by maximizing the present value of dividends less new
share issues at time t  in a infinite horizon:
(2)
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1 To be more precise,  ρ  is an expected return on a large number of risky financial assets
between date  t  and date  1 + t . Applying the law of large numbers leads this expected return
to be considered as realized ex-post and therefore known with certainty ex-ante.Jean-Bernhard Chatelain and André Tiomo
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where the firm's one-period nominal discount factor is  ) /( t t ρ β + = 1 1 . Investment
it I  is defined by the capital stock  it K  accounting identity:
(3) ()   1 1 − − − = t , i it it K K I δ ,
δ  is the constant rate of economic depreciation. The flow of funds equation de-
fines corporate dividends. Cash inflows include sales, new share issues, and net
borrowing, while cash outflows consist of dividends, factor and interest pay-
ments, and investment expenditures. Labour charges, interest charges and ac-
counting depreciation are tax deductible. For simplification, we consider that ac-
counting depreciation does not differ from economic depreciation. An investment
tax credit rate  it itc  is taken into account:
(4)
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Where  it N  is a vector of variable factors of production,  () it it N , K F  is the firm's
revenue function ( 0   0 < > KK K F , F ),  t w  is a vector of nominal factor prices,  it i  is
the nominal interest rate on debt,  it B  is the value of net debt outstanding,  it p  is
the price of final goods,  I
st p  is the sectoral price of capital goods;  S
st p  is the
price of new share issues;  t τ  is the corporate income tax rate, against which
interest payments and depreciation are assumed to be deductible.
The nominal interest rate on debt at time t  depends on an agency premium
which increases with debt and decreases with capital taken as collateral and
therefore valued by the current resale price of investment. We assume that the
debt interest rate increases with the debt/capital ratio:  .   0    with ,    ) > '
it it
I
st it it i K p / B ( i
After substitution of dividends by the flow of funds and of investment using the
capital stock equation, we provide first order conditions for the maximisation of
the firm's value. First, the Euler equation with respect to debt is:
(5)
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This condition shows that the optimal debt/capital ratio is independent from
the choice of capital (the optimal debt/capital ratio is unique if for example
0 2 > + ' ' ' i i ). This optimal debt/capital ratio results from the trade-off between the
tax advantage of debt and the increase of the agency costs premium. It is such
that the optimal gap between the rate of return on equity (i.e. the opportunity
cost of equity) and the net-of-tax marginal cost of debt is positive. The Euler
equation with respect to capital is:Investment and the Cost of Capital in the Nineties in France 659
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Each of these three components depends on tax policy. The term  1 1 c −  leads
to the Hall and Jorgenson (1967) formula for the cost of capital without tax dis-
tortions between means of finance and between depreciated assets. Taxation
matters via the investment tax credit which decreases the price of investment.
The term  2 c  is obtained after substitution using the Euler condition on debt. It
decreases the cost of capital due to the tax deductibility of interest charges un-
der the constraint of an increasing cost of debt as leverage increases. In this re-
spect, a higher optimal leverage decreases the cost of capital. The term  3 c  de-
creases the cost of capital due to the deductibility of depreciated capital. To take
into account the case where accounting depreciation differs from constant eco-
nomic depreciation, one has to cancel the third term of the cost of capital  3 c
and substitute the correction of the investment price  () it itc 1−  everywhere it ap-
pears by  () it it z − − itc 1 , where  it z  is the net present value of depreciation allow-
ances (Hayashi 2000, p.60).
Using a first order approximation with respect to the rate of depreciation, to
the tax-corrected inflation rate of the price of investment goods and to the rate of
return on equity, one finds a weighted average cost of capital used by applied
researchers (the cost of equity and the after-tax cost of debt are weighted by
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The Hayashi [2000, p.80] formula can be obtained by setting the investment
tax credit  it itc  to zero and by assuming a constant corporate income tax rate
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We set the investment tax credit rate to zero. The investment tax credit rate is
0% for more than 80% of companies and over 95% for 5% of companies (hence
creating many outliers with near zero user cost), we finally did not take it into
account. We used an accounting measure of capital in leverage instead of an
economic one: the denominator of leverage is the accounting sum of debt B and
of equity E instead of the stock of capital computed by the perpetual inventory
method. This is empirically justified on the grounds that it is the accounting pro-
portions of debt or of equity which matter for tax deductibility. Using the stock of
capital computed by the perpetual inventory method does not guarantee that the
share of debt in capital and the share of equity in capital sum to one. We use a
proxy for the marginal cost of debt which has the drawback of being an average
rate  it AI  (the ratio of interest and similar charges to gross debt) but which as the
advantage of providing information at the firm level and of increasing the vari-
ance of the user cost (61237 observations) with respect to a national annual rate
that we use for the opportunity cost of equity (10 observations, as the estimation
period lasts 10 years).
With respect to the monetary transmission channels, this cost of capital takes
into account the interest rate channel, a part of the credit channel (leverage), the
asset price channel (inflation rate of asset prices such as firms' property prices,
and the price of collateralisable assets used in leverage), as well as potential
reactions to monetary policy of tax policies supporting corporate investment. But
it does not take into account other credit channel effects due to the existence of
a positive dividends constraint, whose Lagrange multiplier would alter the Euler
equation.
2. Parameterization and Econometric Model
We parameterize the production function as a constant elasticity of substitu-
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A, a, and b are productivity parameters, υ  represents returns to scale and σ  is
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Computing the marginal
productivity of capital and taking logs (small letters represent logs of capital let-
ters), we obtain this long-run demand for capital:Investment and the Cost of Capital in the Nineties in France 661
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For simplification, productivity is assumed to be of the form  2 1 η η
t i it A A A = , so
that the constant and the productivity term  () () a . ln A ln ] / ) [( it υ σ υ σ + − − 1  are taken
into account by the constant related to individual firms (fixed effect) and the time
dummies.
We assume an econometric adjustment process in the form of an auto-
regressive distributed lag model with two lags with respect to the auto-
regressive term and two lags with respect to explanatory variables (ADL(2,2)),
as in Hall, Mairesse, Mulkay (2000). We consider four ways of estimating such a
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where  i α  is an individual constant (fixed effect),  t α  is a time constant (year ef-
fect) and  it ε  is a random shock. We add cash-flow (otherwise a potentially
omitted variable, among other variables) on the grounds that our model does not
take fully into account financial constraints. The long-run elasticity of sales is
given by  ) /( ) ( LT 2 1 2 1 0 1 γ γ β β β β − − + + =  and the long-run elasticity of the cost
of capital is given by  ) /( ) ( LT 2 1 2 1 0 1 γ γ σ σ σ σ − − + + − = − . Return to scale is given
by  ) /( ) ( LT LT LT σ β σ ν − − = 1 . As explained later, we estimate this model in first
differences using the generalised method of moments (GMM). The endogenous
variable is then  it k ∆  where  ∆  is the first difference operator ( 1 − − = ∆ t , i it it k k k ).
In model ADL-I, the aim is only to write the investment ratio as the explanatory
variable. We subtract  1 − t , i k  from both sides in order to use the approximation
δ − = ∆ − ) K / I ( k t , i it it 1 . The Taylor rest of the power series:
() ( ) () ∑
+∞
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is neglected. (We computed the stock of capital using the perpetual inventory
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Estimated with GMM first differences, the endogenous variable is now the first
difference of a growth rate. Due to the approximation, model ADL-I has the
drawback that the error term includes power series of the endogenous variable
as the differences of the Taylor rest:  1 − − t , i it R R . We intend to verify whether this
approximation matters. Note that, as the value of current investment is deflated
by the price of current investment, we use the same deflator for cash flow.
The next model is the error correction model ECM(2,2) used on panel data by
Hall, Mairesse and Mulkay (2001) among others. They transform model ADL-I
as follows:
(13)
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Error correction models have been introduced in time series analyses of co-
integration. In particular, the long-run relationship is often estimated in a first
step, with residuals which are integrated of order zero, and the ECM is esti-
mated for transitory dynamics as a second step. An argument is that the
ECM(2,2) on panel data can deal better with the unit root of the explained vari-
able than the ADL(2,2) and ADL-I. First differences can remove the auto-
correlation of one of the variables in the case of a unit root. A very high autocor-
relation in panel data on firms is observed (Hall and Mairesse 2001). A draw-
back of the ECM is that the test for necessary lags is not direct (in particular lag
2) whereas they are directly obtained with the ADL specification. These tests are
important because adding not significant lags can change dramatically the value
of long run elasticities, while these long run elasticities remain significant even
with one or more not significant lags. One needs to recover parameters and
standard errors of the ADL(2,2) and ADL-I models from the ECM parameters
and variance-covariance matrix. For this reason, it is more practical to estimate
directly the ADL(2,2) and ADL-I models. We also estimate this ECM(2,2) model
to check its differences with the ADL(2,2) and ADL-I.
Using the same approximation as in model ADL-I so that the investment ratio
appears as the explanatory variable instead of the log of capital, Chatelain et al.
(2002), among others, used first differences of all the variables of the ADL(2,2)
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The argument put forward for such a model is that productivity of each firm is
affected not only by a fixed effect on the productivity  level but also by anotherInvestment and the Cost of Capital in the Nineties in France 663
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fixed effect on the productivity growth rate denoted  i f . Another argument is that
the stock of capital includes measurement errors, mostly due to the initial condi-
tion in the perpetual inventory method. This argument holds for Within estima-
tions but not for the ADL(2,2), ADL-I and ECM model estimated in first differ-
ences with GMM, as long as the level of the stock of capital is not used as an
instrument. As seen before, differences in the log of capital do not depend on
the initial condition for computing the stock of capital with the perpetual inven-
tory method.
To get rid of the fixed effect on growth rate, one can estimate the difference
ADL model using first differences again. When cash-flow is not taken into ac-
count, this amounts to estimating second differences of the ADL(2,2) model with
instruments in first differences. Conversely, the estimation of the ADL(2,2)
model in GMM first differences amounts to an estimation of the level of the dif-
ference ADL. Note that cash-flow is related to investment in the difference ADL
model. It is seemingly related to investment in the ECM model, but, in the
equivalent ADL model, the first differences of cash-flow/capital are related to the
investment rate.
At least three factors may explain the differences between the GMM results of
the ADL(2,2), ADL-I (or ECM) and the difference ADL: first, fixed effects on the
growth rate of productivity may exist; second, in the difference ADL model, the
lagged dependant variable and residuals are differened twice  2
2
− − = ∆ t , i it it ε ε ε
(differening once more changes the correlation between residuals and the
lagged dependant variable); third, first differences of growth rates enter into the
regression in the difference ADL instead of growth rates in the ADL/ECM model.
The hypothesis of a fixed effect on productivity growth is not so common. It
means that firms are able to differ individually with respect to growth, during an
estimation period which should, in principle, be short. Measurement errors can-
not be avoided by differencing twice with GMM. First differences of the growth
rate are smaller and less auto-correlated than growth rates. From an economet-
rics theory viewpoint, none of the above arguments leads to one of the models
being definitively rejected with respect to the other one (ADL/ECM versus differ-
ence ADL).
Below, we compare the estimations of the ADL(2,2), ADL-I and ECM(2,2)
model with the difference ADL model put forward for France in the comparative
exercise in Chatelain et al. (2001). Our aim is to check what the estimation of
these models changes with respect to other estimations done in the monetary
transmission network (ECM and difference ADL).
In the econometric models, we estimate the year effects by including time
dummies. The estimation of these econometric models presents three potential
groups of problems. First, there may be a correlation between explanatory vari-
ables and the fixed effect on productivity level  i α  (ADL/ECM model) and/or the
fixed effect on productivity growth  i f  in the difference ADL model. This feature is
corrected by taking first differences in the ADL/ECM model or by taking second
differences in the difference ADL model. Second, explanatory variables can be
endogenous, so that an instrumental variables method is recommended. Third,
there is heteroscedasticity of disturbances. A method which takes into accountJean-Bernhard Chatelain and André Tiomo
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these problems is the generalised method of moments on first differences
(GMM) (Arellano and Bond 1991).
The GMM estimation proceeds in two steps. A first step is an instrumental
variable estimation which provides estimated residuals. The second step takes
into account heteroscedasticity. Both first and second step estimates are con-
sistent. The second step estimates are efficient while the first ones are not (see
Matyas 1999 for a detailed presentation of GMM estimations). We estimate all
models with first differences GMM and instruments in levels with the Arellano
and Bond (1991) method, using the DPD98 programs on Gauss.
III. Data and Econometric Results
1. Macroeconomic Background
Financial deregulation in France occurred in the mid-1980s. This led to con-
siderable changes in the money market. Treasury bills took on greater impor-
tance, new financial instruments appeared on the scene, and new equity mar-
kets were set up (“second marché”). There were changes in the regulation of
banks' activities. Quantitative credit regulation of banks by the central bank was
stopped. All these reforms decreased the effect of the credit channel of mone-
tary policy with respect to what it was before the mid-1980s. Post-1990 saw a
stabilisation in the gains from monetary and financial innovations obtained by
small and medium sized firms. This can be explained by several factors: a re-
cession and a period of low activity leading to a high number of failures, a large
amount of bad loans for banks, many of which were related to the end of the
bubble in corporate real estate, the regulation of capital ratios for banks and so
on. Finally, venture capital finance really started and grew sharply from 1996 to
2000, with the help of government intervention.
In the 1990s, companies can be characterised by the following macroeco-
nomic pattern. Distribution of value added, which had worked to the advantage
of corporate profits since 1983, consolidated at historically high levels over the
1990s. This feature, combined with low demand due to low-activity years and
low investment, had a remarkable effect. The loss of sales affected aggregate
profits far less than aggregate investment. Therefore, a high self-financing ratio
prevailed over the period except for the last two years (the aggregate retained
earnings/investment ratio exceeded 100% for several years of the decade). A
direct consequence of this flow of internal income and, perhaps, of “high” real
interest rates for some firms in the early 1990s, was a decrease in leverage,
and, in particular, of the share of bank debt in total liabilities. Conversely, this
meant an increase of the share of equity. Furthermore, the fall in interest rates
from 1995 to 1999 and the decrease of debt led to a decrease in aggregate debt
repayments, which in turn further increased aggregate retained earnings. This
decrease in the relative size of bank credit to firms may have affected banks'
behaviour and their portfolios. In 2000, firms increased their leverage at the ag-
gregate level.Investment and the Cost of Capital in the Nineties in France 665
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The business cycle is characterised by relatively high aggregate investment in
the first year (1990) and the last years (1998 and 1999) of our study. Between
these dates, low investment prevailed: low aggregate investment during the
years 1991, 1992, 1996 and 1997, with slightly higher investment in 1994 and
1995, which followed an exceptionally low investment level during the 1993 re-
cession. Monetary policy shifted from high nominal short-run interest rates from
1990 to 1993 to falling rates from 1994 to 1999. This fall was anticipated on the
bonds market, so that there was an inversion of the yield curve from 1991 to
1993. The high return from short-run debt caused some firms to delay invest-
ment and to accumulate cash during this period.
2. Data
The data set consists of firms' annual accounts and additional information
from surveys collected by the Banque de France in the Balance Sheet Data
Centre's database. For our econometric study, we selected an unbalanced
sample of N = 6,946 firms in the manufacturing sector, over the period 1985-
1999 (see appendix for details). The estimation period is ten years (1990-1999).
This sample was obtained after deleting outliers for several variables and after
selecting firms that were present for at least six years consecutively (see the
data appendix for the sample selection).2 A comparison with some samples
used in previous studies shows that our panel is rather large and includes a
larger set of small firms. Descriptive statistics for variables used in the regres-
sions are presented on table 1.
Table 1
Summary Statistics on the Complete Cleaned Data Set
(Number of Firms: 6,946. Number of Observations: 61,237)
Mean Std. Dev. Mini-
mum
25% Median 75% Maxi-
mum
It/Kt-1 0.122 0.141 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.15 1.43
∆log St 0.0296 0.153 -1.78 -0.05 0.03 0.11 1.36
∆log UCt -0.009 0.14 -0.34 -0.11 -0.015 0.09 0.36
 CFt/Kt-1 0.33 0.33 -0.45 0.16 0.26 0.41 4.32
Log St 8.83 1.38 4.51 7.84 8.61 9.60 17.2
Log UCt -1.77 0.14 -2.26 -1.86 -1.77 -1.67 -1.27
                                                          
2 We are not able to find out how many state owned enterprises are contained in the
sample. They could be some of the largest firm of our sample but we expect there are not
many of them included in it: State owned enterprises are rather large firms in France,
whereas the median size of around sixty employees in our sample.Jean-Bernhard Chatelain and André Tiomo
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These statistics are presented after the removal of outliers and firms that had
not been present for at least six years consecutively (see data appendix). The
evolution of these variables over time is presented in figures 1 and 2 and corre-
sponds to macroeconomic evolution described in section III.1.
Figure 1
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Figure 2
User Cost of Capital and Nominal Interest Rates (Means)
3. Estimation Results Assuming Firms Homogeneity
In table 2, we compare estimations on our French sample using  the ECM
model, used by Gaïotti and Generale (2001) and Mojon, Smets and Vermeulen
(2001), and using the  difference ADL model used in Chatelain et al. (2001),
Valderrema (2001), Chirinko and Von Kalckreuth (2001) and Butzen, Fuss and
Vermeulen (2001).
It is important to define now how we compute the auto-regressive component
for the four models we investigate. It is the sum of the auto-regressive parame-
ters which appears in the ADL(2,2) and the difference ADL(2,2):  2 1 γ γ + . This
auto-regressive component enters at the denominator of long run elasticities of
the user cost and of sales and the long run investment cash flow sensitivity not
only for the ADL(2,2) and the difference ADL(2,2) models but also for the ADL-I
and ECM(2,2) models. The higher this auto-regressive component, the higher
the long run elasticities and sensitivities. We need to precise this point, as in the
ADL-I and the ECM(2,2), the “apparent” auto-regressive parameter is  1 1 − γ , al-
though the underlying auto-regressive component for computing long run elas-
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Table 2
Econometric Results: I(t)/K(t-1) as Dependent Variable
Error Correction Model (2,2) Difference-ADL(2,2)
Within Estimations GMM Two-Steps Within Estimations GMM Two-Steps
Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats
I(t-1)/K(t-2) -0.248 -25.71 -0.111 -3.64 -0.102 -11.41 0.088 8.94
I(t-2)/K(t-3) -0.107 -16.31 0.012 1.81
 Log S(t) 0.118 20.85 0.027 0.75 0.084 15.79 0.004 0.11
 Log S(t-1) 0.134 20.22 0.043 1.17 0.065 11.76 0.039 5.36
 Log S(t-2) 0.028 5.30 0.008 1.47
(LogK-LogS) (t-2) -0.329 -40.32 -0.204 -5.93
Log S(t-2) -0.167 -22.69 -0.165 -5.26
Log UC(t) -0.237 -29.48 -0.018 -0.63
Log UC(t-1) 0.017 2.46 0.003 0.19
Log UC(t-2) 0.000 -0.06 0.015 1.52
 Log UC(t) -0.197 -28.25 -0.008 -0.34
 Log UC(t-1) -0.116 -16.84 -0.011 -0.91
 Log UC(t-2) -0.065 -11.01 0.004 0.58
CF(t)/K(t-1) 0.024 4.12 0.019 0.70 0.063 9.71 0.102 3.72669
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CF(t-1)/K(t-2) 0.036 6.98 0.030 2.09 0.069 11.64 0.075 5.56
CF(t-2)/K(t-3) 0.006 1.33 -0.001 -0.10 0.044 7.82 0.0z16 2.47
Auto-regressive coeff. 0.671* 0.796* -0.209* 0.100*
Long term eff. Sales 0.493* 0.188* 0.146* 0.057*
Long term eff. User Cost -0.669* 0.001 -0.313* -0.016
Long term eff. C.-Flow 0.201 0.239* 0.146* 0.215*
AR2 -1.746p=0.081 -1.737p=0.082
Sargan 164.03p=0.133 156.27p=0.247
Estimation method: 2-step GMM estimates, time dummies and Within estimates. Instruments: lags 2 to 5 of all explanatory variables.Jean-Bernhard Chatelain and André Tiomo
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Using a Within estimator for the ECM(2,2), we find a similar result to that ob-
tained by Mojon, Smets, Vermeulen (2001) who use the BACH database and
omit cash-flow in their regression. The long-term user cost elasticity is very high
(-0.67) and significant. Short-run elasticity is -0.24. It is interesting to see that we
find these similar results with a very high number of disaggregated observations.
Part of our sample is used for constructed French data aggregated by size and
sector in the BACH database. Note that the years of estimation differ between
our study and the one by Mojon, Smets and Vermeulen (2001).
In the Within estimation for the difference ADL(2,2) model, the sum of short-
run user cost elasticities is higher (-0.38) than in the ECM(2,2) model (-0.24),
but the long-run user cost elasticity is now (-0.31), i.e. about half of the one with
ECM(2,2) (-0.67). One observes a similar decrease for long-run sales growth
elasticity when shifting from the ECM model (0.493) to the difference ADL model
(0.146). These differences for long-run elasticities are explained by the auto-
regressive component of each model. In Within estimations, the auto-regressive
coefficient for the log of capital is 0.671 for the ECM. The explained variable in
the difference ADL model is first differences of investment/capital ratios, which
are much less auto-regressive in absolute value, and even negative (-0.209).
However, the gap between investment cash-flow long-term sensitivities is
smaller when shifting from the ECM model to the difference ADL model (from
0.201 to 0.146). This is because the sum of short-run investment cash-flow sen-
sitivities is three times higher in the difference ADL model (0.176) than in the
ECM model (0.066).
Using first difference GMM estimations, these auto-regressive parameters in-
crease in the ECM with respect to the Within estimations, which were biased
downwards (from 0.671 to 0.796). Due to a very low standard error, this pa-
rameter is significantly different from one. The increase of the auto-regressive
parameter from Within to GMM estimator is also found in the difference ADL
model (from -0.209 to 0.10, no longer negative). However the gap between the
auto-regressive parameter of the ECM and the difference ADL remains very
large in the GMM estimation (0.796 to 0.1). Therefore, one gets the long-run co-
efficients by multiplying by 5 the sum of short-run coefficients in the ECM and by
multiplying by 1.10 the sum of short-run coefficients in the difference ADL.
Conversely, short-run coefficients of sales, user cost and cash-flow are
smaller in ECM estimations than in the difference ADL. This result goes hand in
hand with the fact that the auto-regressive parameters explain much more of the
variance in the ECM model. For this reason, long-run elasticities are generally
higher in the ECM model than in the difference ADL, if ever the short-run elas-
ticities are significant. However, in both models, the user cost elasticity is not
significantly different from zero when cash-flow and its lags are explanatory
variables. Sales growth elasticity is significant and lower than in the Within case
(where they were biased upwards). Long-term investment cash-flow sensitivities
are slightly increased using a GMM estimation (they were biased downwards
using Within estimates). The large differences between GMM and Within esti-
mates stress endogeneity and/or heteroscedasticity problems in the Within es-
timations. As the GMM estimator has been designed to deal properly with these
econometric problems, we make no further reference to Within estimations in
the following section.Investment and the Cost of Capital in the Nineties in France 671
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In Chatelain and Tiomo (2001), we check that the ECM(2,2) results are very
close to the ADL(2,2) and ADL-I(2,2) results, where lag 2 of explanatory vari-
ables (except the lag 2 of the dependant variable) are not significant and are
removed. In particular, introducing cash-flow to the regression leads to dramatic
changes in the results: User cost (and sometimes sales growth) are no longer
significant.
The result that the introduction of cash-flow drives down to zero the elasticity of
the user cost with respect to investment (which was significant and negative be-
fore the introduction of cash-flow) is robust to changes of the model: it holds for
the ADL/ECM and the difference ADL model. Not surprisingly, it is robust to the
number of lags used in each models. It holds for other computations of the user
cost such as the apparent interest rate alone, a user cost definition without taxa-
tion, a user cost including more individual information related to investment tax
credit, accounting depreciation instead of a constant depreciation rate, or the “phi”
parameter used by Crépon and Gianella (2001) in order to take into account in an
ad hoc manner the tax differentials between dividends and capital gains. It is ro-
bust to soft trimming of the growth rate of the user cost (removing 1% tails of its
distribution) or to hard trimming of the growth rate of the user cost (removing 5%
tails of its distribution). It is robust to the removal of interest charges from cash-
flow in order to avoid a potential collinearity problem between the apparent interest
rate included in the user cost and cash-flow. It is also robust to the substitution of
cash-flow/capital by the log of liquidity (cash stock).
However, this result is not robust to data and period selection: Chatelain
(2001) obtained a significant elasticity of the user cost excluding taxation on a
sample more or less included in the one we used in this study (a balanced panel
of 4,025 firms from 1988 to 1996, estimated over the period 1993-1996). But this
last result was only obtained after strict upward testing procedures leading to the
selection of highly exogenous instruments (starting from a small set of very ex-
ogenous instruments and testing additional instruments one by one, see An-
drews 1999). On this larger sample, a non-significant user cost was robust to
systematic changes of the instrument sets including lagged explanatory vari-
ables using either upward testing procedures or downward testing procedures
(starting from a large number of instrument sets and removing some of them).
4. Do Some Firms Experience a Tighter Liquidity Constraint
Why does the introduction of cash flow drive the user cost elasticity down to
zero, whereas it is significantly different to zero when cash flow is omitted?
First, we define the user cost as a linear function of a microeconomic apparent
interest rate, which includes an agency premium. According to the broad credit
channel theory (see Gertler and Hubbard 1988), this agency premium decreases
with respect to collateral, which depends on expected profits, which in turn are
very much dependant on expected sales, among other factors (for example, Oliner
and Rudebush 1996 state that the agency premium increases with the risk-free
interest rate). Due to the correlation between future profits and past profits, a po-
tential explanation of the decline in the user cost elasticity, when cash flow isJean-Bernhard Chatelain and André Tiomo
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added to the regression, may lie in the joint correlation between cash flow, sales
and the apparent interest rate (hence user cost). We may face a collinearity prob-
lem, which is not solved by the generalised method of moments.
A second explanation relates to an aggregation bias and to the prevalence of
self-financing during the 1990s for some firms observed in the descriptive statis-
tics, both at the macroeconomic and microeconomic level: some firms may de-
pend much more on cash flow than others. In that case, omitting a dummy vari-
able when selecting these firms may lead to a bias in the estimate and the stan-
dard error of the user cost parameter. This is what we investigate in this chapter.
We found three sample separation dummy variables able to isolate firms such
that their long run investment cash flow excess sensitivity (differential coeffi-
cient) is significantly different to zero. 3 Descriptive statistics with respect to sec-
tors and other sample separation criteria are presented in table 3.
Sample separation with respect to size (Chatelain et al. (this volume)), to the
share of intangibles and to the dividend payout ratio did not yield relevant statis-
tical and economic results, by contrast with other countries.
We considered a dummy variable for firms with a lower share of trade credit in
total liabilities (more precisely, firms for which this ratio is below the upper quar-
tile). This situation may be a signal that these firms are experiencing difficulties
in securing external finance. Investment cash flow sensitivity is 0.25 for firms
with high trade credit to total liabilities ratios, whereas it is zero for other firms,
which is consistent with the above interpretation (table 4). For all firms, sales
growth elasticity is 0.43, but the user cost elasticity is not significantly different to
zero.
We introduced a dummy variable relative to the capital goods sector, which is
more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations than other sectors. Long run in-
vestment cash flow sensitivity is 0.42 for the capital goods sector, whereas it is
only 0.07 for firms in other industrial sectors. Long run sales growth elasticity is
0.29. It is remarkable that the user cost is now significant for all firms with a long
run elasticity of -0.26.
                                                          
3 We run regressions on the full sample including dummy variables related to a sample
separation criteria instead of running different regressions on each sample. This has the
advantages of keeping the highest number of observations and of providing directly statis-
tical tests of significance of the differential coefficients related to dummy variables and
leaves a room to instrument these dummy variables when using the generalized method
of moments.673
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Various Groups of Firms (Average Values. Number of Observations: 61,237)
Number Main Variables
of Firms I(t)/K(t-1)  LogS(t)  LogUC(t) CF(t)/K(t-1) LogS(t) LogUC(t)
All sectors 6946 0.122 0.0296 -0.009 0.33 8.83 -1.77
Sectors Food products 929 0.12 0.01 -0.014 0.27 9.3 -1.8
Intermediate 3371 0.11 0.04 -0.005 0.29 8.8 -1.7
products
Equipment 1227 0.12 0.04 -0.008 0.37 8.7 -1.8
goods
Consumption 1286 0.15 0.01 -0.02 0.47 8.7 -1.8
goods
Car industry 133 0.12 0.03 -0.02 0.31 9.8 -1.8
Scoring No score 481 0.12 0.003 0.004 0.30 9.0 -1.8
Function
Risky Firms 1293 0.12 0.03 -0.008 0.30 8.6 -1.8
Neutral Firms 1169 0.11 0.01 -0.007 0.28 8.5 -1.7
Riskness Firms 4003 0.13 0.04 -0.01 0.36 8.9 -1.8
Trade Credit < Q3 5910 0.13 0.06 -0.003 0.33 8.8 -1.8
> Q3 1736 0.12 0.02 -0.011 0.33 8.8 -1.8
I/K: investment over capital; S: sales; CF/K: cash flow over capital; UC: user cost.674
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Table 4
Auto-Regressive Distributed Lags Model with log(K) as Endogenous Variable
Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats
Log K(t-1) 0.822 31.370 0.835 34.427 0.827 30.713
Log K(t-2) -0.050 -5.670 -0.052 -6.206 -0.066 -5.339
Log S(t) 0.075 2.788 0.041 1.743 0.091 3.210
Log S(t-1) 0.023 0.826 0.022 0.944 0.064 2.697
Log UC(t) -0.035 -1.306 -0.049 -3.019 -0.034 -1.824
Log UC(t-1) 0.003 0.226 -0.007 -0.777 -0.016 -1.707
CF(t)/K(t-1) 0.058 2.406 -0.004 -0.185 -0.015 -0.636
CF(t-1)/K(t-2) -0.001 -0.033 0.018 2.025 0.019 2.147
Differential coef. For: Low Trade Credit Equipment Goods Risky firms
Log K(t-1) 0.003 0.195 0.026 0.901 -0.050 -0.689
Log K(t-2) 0.000 0.598 0.001 0.717 0.086 1.542
Log S(t) 0.004 0.919 0.004 0.411 0.014 0.401
Log S(t-1) -0.004 -0.236 -0.008 -0.322 -0.046 -1.489
Log UC(t) -0.011 -0.481 0.004 0.172 0.023 1.067
Log UC(t-1) -0.002 -0.195 -0.001 -0.067 0.007 0.425
CF(t)/K(t-1) -0.083 -3.413 0.082 3.260 0.077 2.328
CF(t-1)/K(t-2) 0.026 1.392 -0.014 -0.903 -0.034 -2.114675
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Long term eff. Sales 0.43* 0.29* 0.65*
L.T. eff. User Cost -0.14 -0.26* -0.21*
L.T. eff. Cash-Flow 0.25* 0.07* 0.02*
Differential coef. For: Low Trade Credit Equipment Goods Risky firms
Long term eff. Sales 0.01 0.02 -0.04
L.T. eff. User Cost -0.06 -0.02 0.11
L.T. eff. Cash-Flow -0.25* 0.36* 0.22*
AR2 -2.266 p = 0.023 -2.077 p = 0.038 -1.993 p = 0.046
Sargan 288.22 p = 0.088 275.48 p=0.204 300.91 p = 0.031
Instruments used in the regressions are all explanatory variables lagged 2 to 5.Jean-Bernhard Chatelain and André Tiomo
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It is indeed possible that one criterion alone may not be sufficient. The “score”
allocated by the Banque de France is a combination of several criteria which
makes it possible to measure the risk of company failure. According to the
Banque de France scoring system, risky firms (i.e. those whose score function is
below -0.3) present a long run investment cash flow sensitivity of 0.24, whereas
it is only 0.02 for other firms. This result was expected, as these firms experi-
ence more difficulties in getting access to external financing. Sales growth elas-
ticity is now 0.65. As for the capital goods sector, the user cost elasticity is sig-
nificant for all firms with a long run value of -0.21.
Finally, we present the results obtained by using the risky firm dummies when
the cash stock replaces the cash flow. For some authors, investment cash flow
excess sensitivities are not valid measures of the financing constraint (see
Kaplan and Zingales 1997). One could argue that they are more likely to be
valid measures when the sample separation criterion measures, as much as
possible, the risk of bankruptcy, such as the last one we used. The stock of a
firm’s cash plays the same role as the cash flow, as it is an indicator of the firm’s
ability to shield future investment from an expected tightening of borrowing con-
ditions. The stock of cash may be less affected by the difficulty in interpreting in-
vestment cash flow sensitivity, as liquidity is less likely to be a proxy of expecta-
tions of future profits, which is supposed to determine investment behaviour
without financial constraints. The stock of cash is also less correlated with sales
than cash flow, which partially removes some multicollinearity-related problems
in the investment equation.
When the stock of cash replaces the cash flow in the investment regression
and when dummy variables relative to company risk are added to the regres-
sion, the user cost elasticity also becomes significant, reaching a nearly un-
changed estimate of -0.23 (see table 5).
This is an additional robustness check for the user cost elasticity. The previ-
ous year’s cash stock is a significant determinant of current investment, as a
proportion of the previous year’s cash may finance this year’s investment. How-
ever, unlike investment cash flow excess sensitivity, investment cash stock ex-
cess sensitivity is not significant for more risky firms, but, at the same time, risky
firms’ elasticity of investment with respect to sales is significantly lower than that
of other firms. This means that the investment of risky firms reacts much less to
sales than that of other firms, but it could also suggest a misspecification of fi-
nancial constraints in the investment equation.Investment and the Cost of Capital in the Nineties in France 677
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Table 5
Auto-Regressive Distributed Lags Model with log(K)
as Endogenous Variable and Cash Stock as Liquidity Variable
Coeff. T-Stats
Less Risky Firms
Log K(t-1) 0.785 36.2
Log K(t-2) -0.053 -4.4
Log S(t) 0.094 3.79
Log S(t-1) 0.106 4.80
Log UC(t) -0.053 -3.01
Log UC(t-1) -0.011 -1.12
Cash(t)/K(t-1) -0.007 -0.42
Cash(t-1)/K(t-2) 0.041 2.93
Differential coef. for: Risky Firms
Log K(t-1) -0.033 -0.54
Log K(t-2) 0.055 1.10
Log S(t) 0.029 1.02
Log S(t-1) -0.091 -3.38
Log UC(t) 0.006 0.31




Long term eff. Sales 0.743*
L.T. eff. User Cost -0.238*
L.T. eff. Cash Stock 0.125*
Differential coef. For: Risky Firms
Long term eff. Sales -0.339*
L.T. eff. User Cost n.s.
L.T. eff. Cash Stock n.s.
AR2 -1.694 p = 0.090
Sargan 292.01 p = 0.066
Instruments used in the regressions are all explanatory variables lagged 2 to 5.
(n.s. : not significant).Jean-Bernhard Chatelain and André Tiomo
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IV. Conclusion
We reach two major conclusions. First, by introducing sample separation
dummy variables, which enable us to isolate more precisely those firms which
are more sensitive to cash flow, we improve the precision of the results pre-
sented in Chatelain et al. (this volume) for France. The user cost elasticity with
respect to investment is at the most 0.26 in absolute terms for all the firms of our
sample. This result is obtained using generalised method of moments estimates
for dynamic panel data, unlike other recent papers which assess user cost ef-
fects at the firm level in France. This confirms the direct effect of the interest rate
channel on investment, operating through the cost of capital.
Second, we find three groups of firms for which investment is more sensitive
to cash flow: firms facing a high risk of bankruptcy, firms belonging to the capital
goods sector (which are more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations) and firms
making extensive use of trade credit, a potential substitute for short-term bank
credit. The rather high investment cash flow sensitivity of these firms (between
0.24 up and 0.42), which represent about 20% of our sample, confirms the ex-
istence of a broad credit channel operating through corporate investment in
France. For other firms, investment cash flow sensitivity is close to zero.
These results offer a basis for further investigations into the effects of mone-
tary policy on individual investment, and the macro-economic consequences for
the monetary transmission channels.
Summary
Using a large panel of 6,946 French manufacturing firms, this paper investigates the
effect of the cost of capital and on cash flow on investment from 1990 to 1999. We com-
pare several specifications of neo-classical demand for capital, taking into account transi-
tory dynamics. The user cost of capital has a significant negative elasticity with respect to
capital using traditional Within estimates, or as long as cash-flow is not added to the re-
gression when using Generalised Method of Moments estimates. When dummy variables
related to firms more sensitive to cash flow are added in the model, the user cost elasticity
is significant again and its estimate s is at most -0,26.
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The data source consists of compulsory accounting tax forms (collected by
the Banque de France in its FIBEN database) and of additional information (in
particular on leasing) taken from surveys collected by the Banque de France
(the Balance Sheet Data Centre's database). These data are collected only from
firms who are willing to provide them, a procedure which creates a bias (small
firms of fewer than 20 employees are under-represented). No statistical sam-
pling procedure has been used to correct this bias.
A first elimination of outliers was done on a larger unbalanced sample of
manufacturing firms without holdings. Outliers were excluded using ratios built
on information common to the two databases. The first step consisted in delet-
ing firms with missing or inconsistent data: we selected firms with no more than
one fiscal account on the same year and for which the length of the accounting
period was 12 months. We deleted firms for which the number of employees,
sales, value added, assets, investment or debt were negative. The second step
consisted in removing the following data:
•   first percentile and the two upper percentiles of investment over capital;
•   first percentile and the two upper percentiles of cash-flow over capital;
•   first and 99th percentile of the apparent interest rate;
•   first and 99th percentile of debt over capital;
•   first and 99th percentile of sales growth;
•   first percentile and the two upper percentiles of user cost;
•   below the 5% percentile and above the 95% percentiles of the growth
rate of the user cost.
From the initial Balance Sheet Data Centre database (209,112 initial observa-
tions), we obtained an unbalanced panel of 61,237 observations i.e. 6,947
manufacturing firms observed over 14 years.
A.2. Construction of the Variables
The Individual Variables
The first source is the compulsory accounting forms required under the
French General Tax Code. These forms are completed by the firms and num-
bered by the tax administration (D.G.I.) from 2050 to 2058. We provide the code
of each form omitting the  first two numbers For example, we denote item FN of
tax form 2050 as “(50).FN”. The second source is the Banque de France survey
of the Balance Sheet Data Centre. The form 2065 provides information on
mergers and acquisitions. The form 2066 provides information on leasing. ForJean-Bernhard Chatelain and André Tiomo
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example, we denote “(cdb65).031” the item 031 of the survey form 2065. Data
common to monetary transmission network papers are constructed according to
Chatelain and Kashyap’s note (2000).
Sales are total net sales (52).FL, plus the change in inventories of own pro-
duction of goods and services (52).FM, plus own production of goods and serv-
ices capitalised (52).FN divided by the value added deflator.
Cash flow is output ((52).FL+FM+FL+FO+FQ) minus intermediate consump-
tion ((52).FS+FU+FT+FV+FW+FX) minus personal costs ((52).FY+FZ) plus net
financial income ([52].GP-GU) minus corporate income tax ((53).HK) plus oper-
ating depreciation and provisions ((52).GA+GB+GC+GD+(56)(5T-UF)).
Productive gross investment is the sum of total increases by acquisition of
tangible assets (54).LP minus the sum of (i) the decreases by transfers of tangi-
ble assets under construction (54).MY, and (ii) the decreases by transfers of de-
posits and prepayments (54).NC minus (cdb65).031.
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Gross debt  it B  includes quasi equity (51).DO (proceeds from issues of par-
ticipating securities plus subordinated loans), convertible bonds (51).DS, other
bonds (51).DT, bank borrowings (51).DU, other borrowings (51).DV, other li-
abilities (51).EA and discount (58).YS minus the bond redemption premium
(50).CM.
Apparent interest rate  it AI  is the ratio of interest and similar charges (52).GR
to gross debt.
Equity  it E  is stockholders' equity (51).DL.
The long-term interest rate  t LD is the French ten-year government reference
bond rate.
The statutory tax rate  t τ  is (53).HK except for firms which were not paying
corporate income tax on a given year. The rate is set at zero for these firms in
this given year. 4
The capital stock is the value in replacement terms of the capital stock book
value of property, plant and equipment. To convert the book value of the gross
capital stock into its replacement value, we used the following iterative perpetual
inventory formula:
                                                          
4 As the investment tax credit rate ((51).DJ divided by investment) is 0% for more than
80% of companies and over 95% for 5% of companies (hence creating many outliers with
near zero user cost), in the end we did not take it into account.Investment and the Cost of Capital in the Nineties in France 683
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where the investment goods deflator is denoted  I
st p  and the depreciation rate is















0    with ,   − = =
The book value of the gross capital stock of property, plant and equipment
BV
it K 0  on the first available year for each firm is obtained by the sum of land
(50).AN, buildings (50).AP, industrial and technical plant (50).AR, other plant
and equipment (50).AT, plant, property and equipment under construction
(50).AV and payments in advance/on account for plant, property and equipment
(50).AX. It is deflated by assuming that the sectoral price of capital is equal to
the sectoral price of investment  mean T  years before the date when the first book
value was available, where  mean T  represents the corrected average age of
capital (this method of evaluation of capital is sometimes called the “stock
method”). The average age of capital  mean T  is computed by using the sectoral
useful life of capital goods  max T  and the share of goods which has been already




it 0 0 0 DEPR
( BV
it0 DEPR is the total book value of depreciation allowances in year  0 t  according


























































































The book value of depreciation allowances  BV
it0 DEPR  is obtained by the sum
of depreciation, amortisation and provisions on land (50).AO, on buildings
(50).AQ, on industrial and technical plant [50].AS, on other plant and equipment
(50).AU, on plant, property and equipment under construction (50).AW and on
payment in advance/on account for plant, property and equipment (50).AY.
                                                          
5 This formula is used by Mairesse in the Bond et al. (1997) paper.Jean-Bernhard Chatelain and André Tiomo
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The sectoral useful life of capital goods is  15 max = T  years, except for sectors
C4 ( 13 max = T ), sector D0 ( 16 max = T ), sectors E1 and E2 ( 14 max = T ), sector
E3 ( 12 max = T ), and finally sector F1 ( 17 max = T ).
The Sectoral Variables
We selected 5 NES16 sectors: food products, consumption goods indus-
tries, equipment goods industries, intermediate products industries, and the
car industry.
Investment goods deflators  I
st p  used for the NES16 sectors are taken from
the Annual National Accounts (base 1995).
Gross value-added deflators  st p  used for the  NES16 sectors are taken from
the Annual National (base 1995).